Justification: State Action
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." -14th amendment
Though the 14th amendment seemed to protect all U.S. citizens from discrimination, it’s important to note its language only prevents states themselves from commiting acts of discrimination. Yet this delineation between state and private actors isn’t always clear, which has led to constantly shifting view from the Supreme Court of what is considered “state action” (Columbia, 1243). Prior to Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court had already begun redefining state action through instrumentality theory: the idea that the actions of non-governmental organizations could be understood as governmental (and therefore viewed as unconstitutional) if they had received aid or assistance from the state, or were fulfilling the role of the state in some way (Cahen, 720).
Perhaps the most direct precursor to Shelley v. Kraemer in terms of the expanding view of what constitutes state action was Marsh v. Alabama (1945). This case concerned Marsh, a Jehovah’s witness who was convicted of trespassing after attempting to distribute religious literature on the sidewalk of Chicksaw, Alabama, a company town owned by The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation (Marsh v. Alabama decision). The court ruled in favor of Marsh, arguing that the town managers, despite working for a private company, were serving in a governmental capacity, and therefore could not inhibit Marsh’s freedom of expression or religious liberty. This expansion of what could be defined as state action was a crucial step towards Shelley v. Kraemer’s even more expansive view.
"We have no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in the full and complete sense of the phrase. The undisputed facts disclose that petitioners were willing purchasers of properties upon which they desired to establish homes. The owners of the properties were willing sellers, and contracts of sale were accordingly consummated. It is clear that, but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint." -Shelley v. Kraemer decision (p. 334 U.S. 19)
Shelley v. Kraemer’s ruling hinges upon the logic that by enforcing racial covenants, the Missouri court had given governmental support to a private institution’s discriminatory action. This was the first time that the Supreme Court affirmed the idea that state courts cannot enforce private “rights” detailed in contracts if those contracts infringe upon constitutional rights (Columbia, 1243). Yet this ruling wasn’t without its limitations; although these covenants could not be enforced, property owners could still include them as part of contracts.